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Let me start this address w ith an hypothesis. I suggest tha t the m ixed profile of 
success and failure in CBN RM  in the Region ow es much of its am bigu ity to our 
strategic pragmatism  in its implementation. W e have placed po licy  and practice 
before politics and thus have encouraged the birth o f CBN RM  (in its "m odern" 
version) into a politico-legal environment w h ich , if not hostile , is hardly a nurturing 
one. In so doing we have put an ironic tw is t on the conventiona l approach to 
planned change. A  recent draft article on rhino conservation  sent to me for review  
complains that "m uch time and money get w asted in the po litica l battlefie ld trying 
to shape out polic ies that do not get implemented on the ground." W e in CBNRM  
programmes have done the opposite. We have spent a lot o f time and money in 
implementation on the ground, leaving the outcom es o f the  po litica l battlefield 
w h ich  surrounds it largely unresolved.
Please do not m isunderstand me. In retrospect, I do not th ink  that our strategy has 
been wrong. W e have grasped the essential princip les, generally taken the right 
po licy directions, and have seized the opportunities to put these into practice when 
they have occurred. Had w e not done so, com m unity based approaches to natural 
resource management m ight well be still at a concep t stage, s tu ck  on the agenda 
of endless interm in isteria l planning meetings and gathering dust on the in-trays of 
our respective bureaucracies. But what l am suggesting is that in our initial and 
successfu l end-run around political processes w e  run the risk o f ignoring their 
centra lity to long-term  CBN RM  success. Our "pragm atic stra teg ies" may cause us 
to be com placent about the introduction o f our "optim al p rinc ip les."
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The Private Land Prototype for CBNRM  in Southern A frica
Let me illustrate from our history what I mean by "our end run around political 
processes." In Zim babwe and Namibia the prototype for the five CBN RM  principles 
mentioned in Steiner and R ihoy 's Background Paper for th is Conference was 
established in the mid 1990 's  w ith respect to private farms and ranches. W ith 
m inor d ifferences, Nam ib ia 's Nature Conservation Ordinance (No. 4  o f 1974) and 
Z im babw e 's Parks and W ild Life A c t (1975) conferred "ow nersh ip" or 
"custod iansh ip" of w ild life  resources on the ow ners o f privatised land. In both 
cases the legislation, and the po licy philosophy behind it, w as that the best way 
to conserve w ild life w as to confer strong property rights over it to the people who 
had the greatest incentive to use it susta inably and w ho were best placed to 
manage it e ffectively.
Let us pause to note the institutional regime thus put in place:
a) The farm owner, w ith fixed tenuriai rights over a defined land unit, was 
given tenure over w ild life  on that land. "Tenure" implies long-term  property 
rights and the ow ner's  long-term rights over land were extended to long­
term rights over w ild life, a critical incentive factor for using it sustainably.
b) By giving the farm owner property rights over w ild life, or ow nersh ip , the 
owner gained the right to decide how  to use it and to benefit (or suffer) 
from his management decis ions. In academ ic language, "ow nersh ip " is the 
"p lacem ent w ith a person (or a group of persons) of a certa in  group o f rights 
to property: the rights o f possession, use and d isposal o f w o rth ."  (Harper, 
1974: 18)
c) By giving the farm ow ner rights to the "d isposal o f w o rth " o f w ild life , he 
w as empowered to make market decis ions, rather than have these made for 
him by others. Th is active producer presence is an im portant feature of 
effic ient markets, reducing centre-periphery im balances in national 
econom ies.
d) The w ild life  management unit became far smaller and more effic ient, a 
regime in w h ich  the linkages between cost and benefit, quality o f input and 
quantity o f output were immediate and transparent.
e) The balance in governm ent's role in w ild life  m anagem ent shifted 
sign ificantly  aw ay from  regulation tow ards extension, w ith  fa r low er budgets 
required.
The legislation which produced these institutional changes in Z im babw e and 
Nam ibia was passed 20 years ago. The econom ic and eco log ica l e ffects are 
categorica l. On private land in both countries a new  and flou rish ing  w ild life 
industry is in place, w ild life  revenues haver' increased dram atica lly , w ild life 
populations have expanded and the ir habitat has improved.
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App ly ing  the Prototype to Communal Lands
W ith th is success model in hand it w as a natural po licy step for w ild life  authorities 
to seek to extend it to communal lands. Th is, in fact, is w hat is being attempted 
in the various CBNRM  programmes of the region. But the transplant of the model 
to com m unal lands is neither easy nor simple. I mention here three factors:
a) The units analogous to private farms in communal lands are not surveyed 
entities. They may well exist in the socia l and ecolog ica l geographies of 
local culture and traditional authority. They may appear on the 
adm inistrative maps of local governance, but frequently these have little 
econom ic and ecolog ica l rationale. W e are not sure o f the criteria to be used 
in determ ining these units, other than that they should be sm all enough to 
provide face-to-face interaction for all members. This may in the long term  
be a good thing since they should be self-determ ined, but in the sho rtte rm  
it makes in itiation d ifficu lt.
b) A  second problem is that the analogous proprietorial unit in com m unal lands 
is far more organizationally com plex than the private farm or ranch. Its 
membership is larger and internally d ifferentiated. Furthermore, not only is 
it differentiated in terms of its membership but also in terms of categories 
o f resources, members having spec ific  usufruct rights over arable land but 
also having co llective rights to the com m unal comm ons.
c) The third and greatest problem is the tenure status o f com m unities on 
com m unal lands. Our citizens in com m unal lands do not have strong 
property rights, i.e. "the rights of possession , use and d isposa l o f w orth ."
M y use o f the word "strong" here is ind icative  o f the fact that there are degrees 
o f ow nersh ip . Ownersh ip is never absolute. Its strength is determ ined by its time 
frame and the conditiona lities attached to it. The longer its sanctioned duration, 
its "tenure", the stronger it w ill be. The few er the conditiona lities attached to it, 
the stronger it w ill be. As A lch ian says, the strength of ow nersh ip "can be defined 
by the extent to w hich the ow ner's decis ion  to use the resource actually 
determ ines its use." (Alchian, 1987: 1031). A s  inhabitants of w hat is techn ica lly  
state land, com m unities in communal lands do not have strong property rights in 
either o f these dimensions. Their tenure is uncertain, their dec is ions on the use of 
resources subject to a plethora of cond itiona lities. A s in co lon ia l tim es, com m unal 
lands continue to be in various degrees the fiefdom s of state bureaucracies, 
po litica l elites and their private sector entrepreneurial partners. The pers istence of 
th is cond ition  into the modern post-co lon ia l state is an ind ication that the 
devo lution o f strong property rights to com m unal land peoples is a fundam ental 
a llocative  and politica l issue and that pow er structures at the po litica l and 
econom ic centre are unlikely to surrender the ir present position easily.
W hether we w ant to adm it it or not, CBN R M  .has plunged us into th is political 
battlefie ld. In the technica lly-insp ired attem pt to transfer the success  o f strong 
property rights over w ild life  on private land to com m unal land proprietoria l units,
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the khaki shorts eco logy brigade has led us into a largely unrecognised struggle 
over property rights in rural A frica. Its im plications are profound.
In an incis ive overv iew  of tw o decades of attem pts to promote com m unity forestry 
in Nepal, Ta lbott and Khadka show  the parallel e lsewhere:
"The tenuriai rights o f local peoples over natural resources and the role o f 
the state in recognizing and supporting those rights continues to be a 
paramount issue o f development, not only in Nepal, but throughout the 
developing world. The resolution o f the concomitant social, economic, and 
political side issues may well mean the difference between sustainable 
development and accelerated economic and environmental impoverishment. " 
(Talbott and Khadka, 1994: 2)
And, one m ight add, tenuriai rights w ill make the d ifference between rural 
dem ocratic representation and the continuation of perpetual ado lescent status for 
the comm unal peoples of Southern Africa in national structures o f governance.
Pragmatic Implementations! Strategies in CBN RM : The "end-run" around po litics
It is only when these three problems involved in the transference of the private 
land strong property rights prototype to com m unal lands are resolved that the 
"optimal p rincip les" for CBNRM  can operate. The log ica l fram ew ork planning 
approach urged on us by many donors w ou ld  d ictate  that w e  should have 
developed CBN R M  in a sequentia l approach invo lv ing  firs t ana lysis, then po licy 
formulation, then po litica l endorsement, then the  leg isla tive  enactm ents conferring 
strong property rights on communities, and fina lly  im plementation. W e chose 
instead to take a sim ultaneous, experimental approach to all three issues. W e 
advocated po licy  changes on technical grounds, cap ita lis ing on the frequent 
inability of governm ents to fu lly grasp the im plications of advice from their 
technica l agencies. Bell and C larke 's ana lysis is re levant here:
"In a specialised sphere such as wildlife m anagem ent... the formulation of 
pq/icy detail is delegated to the technical agency. Policy is, therefore 
generated at middle management levels but is formally adopted at higher 
levels; and this, we believe, occurs without a thorough appreciation by the 
higher government levels of the implications, consequences and 
requirements o f the po licy ." (Bell and C larke, 1984: 471)
W e gained broad po litica l support for the po licy  by appeals to popular sentim ent - 
w as it not after all a rem oval of d iscrim ination betw een w h ite  and b lack farmers? 
W e masked the deeper politica l and econom ic im p lica tions o f CBN R M  by cloaking 
it in the am biguous language of current deve lopm ent-speak, talk ing o f 
"involvem ent, ""p a rtic ip a tion ,"  "decentra lisa tion ," "co-m anagem ent" and "revenue 
sharing." W e exp lo ited legal and procedural n iches to create revo lv ing funds for 
w ild life  revenues or to decentra lise contro ls over com m unal land w ild life  to lower
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tiers of government. W e identified - however im perfectly - communal units of 
w ild life management and invested large extension resources in the development of 
their internal management systems. And, where there has been the right 
combination of com m unal assertiveness, resource availab ility, supportive local 
bureaucratic authority and quality facilitation, we have succeeded. This success 
is, however, conditiona l - conditional on the com bination described above, and 
conditional on a continued state indulgence that it should proceed. The success 
is based on perm ission, not mandate.
Strategies for the Next Phase:
Institutionalising CBN RM  in National Policies and Po litics
M y v iew  should now  be clear. For long-term susta inab ility  CBN RM  requires a 
fundamental sh ift in national policies on tenure in com m unal lands. The core o f the 
matter is strong property rights for co llective comm unal units, not on ly over w ild life 
and other natural resources, but over the land itself.
I return to the Nepal Forestry paper quoted earlier. The authors have this to say:
"The key issue is ownership. Current forestry laws clearly stipulate that 
community forest user groups do not have direct ownership rights to the 
land, only usufruct rights of management over the trees and the forest 
products derived from the land... In short, the official policy is to "hand 
over" the forests, but by retaining possession o f the land itself, the 
government is not truly "handing over" the forests at a ll." (Talbott and 
Khadka, 1994: 11)
These observations app ly to CBNRM  in Southern A frica  as w ell. Communal 
proprietary units need not only strong property rights over w ild life  but also the 
same rights over their land base and other natural resources on it for an integrated 
management system . Until this is in place, our "optimal p rinc ip les" w ill have an 
uneasy fit w ith the jurisd ictional fragmentation that currently pertains. A s M etca lfe 
puts it,
"For as long as communal land resources are both formally state, and 
informally customary lands, authority and management will be compromised, 
and open access tendencies will thrive." (Metcalfe, 1995: 8)
The creation o f a new  tenure category o f com m unal land, com prised of legally 
titled co llective and com m unal property right holders, separate  from  state and 
private tenure categories, would of course invo lve a sw eep ing  agrarian reform. 
To achieve it w ill require a process well beyond the m andate o f those d irectly 
involved in CBNRM . But the evolution of CBN RM  in Southern  A fr ica  suggests that 
it has played an im portant role in initiating th is process and it bears a responsib ility 
for contributing further to  its momentum. W e-can  no longer continue our "end- 
run" strategy of avoid ing centra l political processes.
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Three strategic thrusts suggest them selves at this stage:
a) The arena of techn ica l d iscourse on CBNRM  must be broadened to include 
the insights and expertise o f other techn ica l line m in istries responsib le for 
agriculture and lands. Agricu lture is particularly im portant s ince  it is also 
about natural resource use, and d irectly  converges w ith  CBN RM  interests on 
such top ics as livestock use o f the grazing com m ons. Indeed it could be 
argued that natural resource management is agriculture in the broad sense 
o f the term. The fac t that w ild life  production on private land is now  usually 
coordinated by associations linked to com m ercia l agricu ltural production is 
not a co incidence.
The technical sponsorsh ip of CBNRM  can thus no longer be the exclusive 
purview  of government environmental agencies if its potentia l is to be fu lly 
developed. M in istries involved in local governance are also clearly
important. A ll this points to the need for greater inter-m inisterial
coord ination in CBNRM  planning and implementation.
b) One relatively unexplored interim step towards the con ferm ent of strong 
property rights on com m unities is the use of existing leg islation on the 
establishment of cooperatives, turning com m unities into natural resource 
cooperatives. This approach was in fact suggested in the orig inal planning 
for CAM PFIRE in Zim babwe but not pursued in im plem entation. The 
possib ility deserves re-exam ination in our respective current legal contexts.
c) The third, and m ost urgent, strateg ic thrust now  dem anding attention is 
political advocacy for CBNRM  at the po litica l centre. By th is  l do not mean 
renewed or expanded efforts by environmental technocra ts , rural 
development agencies, academ ic activ is ts  or donor enthusiasts to  persuade 
the political power structure o f the im portance of CBN RM . Such e ffo rts may 
have peripheral influence but if, as 1 have claimed, optim al cond itions for 
CBNRM  require strong tenurial rights for com m unities, th is requires a 
fundamental devolution o f power, one w h ich  politic ians are un like ly  to make 
unless there is a strong political reason to do so. This reason can on ly  lie 
in a strong, po litica lly  potent constituency demand that th is takes place.
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There is only one source from  w h ich  th is po litica lly  salient constituency  vo ice  can 
arise w ith  any potency and th is is the rural resource-m anaging com m unities 
them selves. A t  this level the w ill and intent is present and it is one o f the 
successes o f CBNRM  that it has contributed in some rural com m unities to a more 
aggressive demand for strong tenurial rights. However, th is assertion o f 
com m unity self-interest remains largely ep isod ic  and fragmented. It needs to be 
coa lesced into an organised and channelled advocacy. In part th is can  be done at 
parliam entary constituency levels. But it also needs to be done at national levels, 
w ith  representative and effective  organ isations speaking on behalf o f CBNRM  
constituencies. To my know ledge, in this regibn only Z im babw e has progressed 
on th is front through the CAM PFIRE  A ssoc ia tion . The im portance o f th is kind of 
representation at this stage is critica l and should be a -priority for CBN RM  initiatives
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in each country of the region. W ithout it an essentia l feature of long-term national 
CBNRM  susta inab ility  w ill be missing.
Conclusion
This address has suggested that our strategy of initial experimentation and 
implementation under existing politico-legal cond itions has been pragmatically 
productive. W e have laid the empirical basis for substantive po licy and political 
change. It has also suggested, however, that w e have now  reached the stage 
where that experience must actively be applied in the politica l arena; w ith  tenurial 
em powerm ent being the goal and the com m unities them selves being the principal 
actors.
The era o f externally-derived innovation in CBN RM  should be brought to an end. 
The era o f self-determ ined, tenurially robust com m unal natural m anagement should 
be brought into being. If this conference contributes to a sharper defin ition o f 
w hat is needed to bring about this further evolution, it w ill be justified.
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